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COMMENTS
CONGRESS OR THE COURTS AS
FINAL ARBITER IN TAX DISPUTES?
WILLIAM J. BOWE*
During the last two years the Supreme Court of the United States
has handed down only five income tax opinions. The box score stands
four for the Government, one for the taxpayer. None of the cases
involved modifications in fundamental concepts of tax law or resulted
in major policy changes in the administration of the fiscal system. The
record for the taxpayer is far more impressive in the Congress than
it is in the courts. As will be pointed out later Congress rather than
the Supreme Court is tending to become the final arbiter in tax dis-
putes. Problems that were traditionally solved by the judiciary are
more and more being solved by Congress and this shift has not hurt the
taxpayer.
The Concept of Taxable Income
There has never been a precise, all-inclusive definition of taxable
income. Section 22 of the Code defines income as "gains, profits or
income." Thus the definition contains the very word to be defined.
An early Supreme Court case, Eisner v. Macomber,' gave us what has
become a working concept. It defined income as "Gain derived from
capital, from labor or from both combined. - This statement has been
incorporated in the regulations' and continues to be the closest ap-
proach to a definition that we haxe. While winnings on radio contests
have long been regarded as taxable income, the Tax Court refused to
tax an award made on the Pot 0' Gold program.' There the taxpayer
received $1,000 simply because he happened to be at home when his
telephone rang. He employed no capital, he rendered no service.
This, thought the court, was different from making a fool of oneself
for a contingent fee on Groucho Marks' program.
Borrowed money is not income. There is no gain. It may later be-
come income if the debtor compromises the claim for less than the full
amount,' or the statute of limitations bars a recovery Similarly the
finding of money or property does not result in taxable income since
the finder is a bailee. On the same reasoning the Supreme Court held
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; author of numerous books and
articles on tax law.
1. 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521 (1920).
2. Ibid.
3. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) (1) (1943).
4. Pauline C. Washburn v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
5. Comm'r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 93 L. Ed. 477 (1949).
6. Securities Co. v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that stolen money was not subject to the tax.' The thief gets no title.
He is like the borrower and the finder. On the other hand the fact
that money or property has been illegally obtained does not prevent
its being income. Thus the proceeds from gambling, from the opera-
tion of a bucket shop, and other unlawful occupations have always
been subject to tax.'
The Tax on Ill-Gotten Gains
It is well settled that if I steal a diamond ring I have no income.
What if I obtain it by fraud? What if I trick a widow into exchanging
a diamond ring for some worthless oil stock? In Rutkin v. United
States,' the taxpayer, an underworld trigger-man, became associated
with a group of bootleggers in 1929 in an operation known as "High
Seas Venture." He contributed no capital but received a share in the
profits because his associates were fearful that otherwise they would
have "trouble and interference." In 1933, with the end of prohibition,
his associates turned honest and formed a company to carry on a
legitimate liquor business. They attempted to exclude Rutkin but he
claimed a vested right to the same proportionate share in the new ven-
ture that he had in the old. His associates finally paid him $60,000 for
his alleged claim, taking a formal assignment of his interest, if any.
But hoodlums are not thus easily bought out. Through the years with
a nice disregard for the document of assignment he insisted he was
still "in." His insistence took the form of threats that he would kill
members of the family of the principal stockholder if his claims were
ignored. Over the years he was paid more than $750,000. Were these
receipts taxable income or were they, as the taxpayer contended, tax
exempt like stolen money? The Supreme Court reaffirming the tra-
ditional distinction between void and voidable transactions held that
money obtained through extortion was income. It is true that an
action could have been brought to recover these sums. But meanwhile
he had the funds under a claim of right. He was not indebted like the
borrower, the finder or the thief. The money was his until a court of
equity should avoid the transaction.
The Requirement of an Annual Accounting Period
One wonders why the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Rutkin
case. Less than a year earlier it had affirmed the claim of right doc-
trine in a more conventional controversy. In Lewis v. United States,"
the taxpayer had reported and paid tax on an employee-bonus of
7. Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 66 Sup. Ct. 35, 90 L. Ed. 413 (1946).
8. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 Sup. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037
(1927).
9. 343 U.S. 130, 72 Sup. Ct. 571 (1952). For a detailed discussion of this
case, see infra, at XXX.
10. 340 U.S. 590, 71 Sup. Ct. 522, 95 L. Ed. 560 (1931).
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$22,000. As a result of subsequent litigation in a state court, it was
found some two years later that the bonus had been improperly com-
puted and he was required to repay $11,000 to his employer. Lewis'
claim for a refund was denied. The Court held that the full amount
of the bonus received was income in the year received, suggesting
that he was entitled to a deduction in the year of repayment. But in the
later year his income may have been less, tax rates may have been re-
duced and, if the year of repayment had happened to be after 1948,
the split income tax provisions 1 would have greatly curtailed the
value of the deduction.
It is not, however, practical to wait until a man dies and then cast
up his life's income and assess the tax thereon. Considerations of a
sound fiscal policy dictate that income taxes be collected on a yearly
basis. The unfairness resulting from the requirement of an annual
accounting period has to some extent been corrected by remedial
legislation. Section 107 of the Code permits prorating earnings received
in one year for services rendered over a period of 36 or more months.
It takes care of lawyers, authors, composers, and others whose income
is likely to be "bunched" in a single year. The capital loss carry-
over,1" the business loss carry-back and carry-forward," the instalment
sale provision' and the completed contract method of accounting," are
illustrations of legislative compromises to avoid the rigors of the yearly
accounting requirement. Perhaps there should be a carry-back and
carry-forward rule for individual as well as business losses.
Contest Winnings
In United States v. Robertson," the Court had an opportunity to
clarify the confused area between gifts and taxable income- an area
in which the lower courts, Commissioner and taxpayers alike had long
floundered. But the opinion, as is not uncommon with recent Supreme
Court opinions, unsettled much more than it settled. A Detroit philan-
tropist, president of the Detroit Orchestra, Inc., offered $25,000 for
the best musical composition submitted by an American composer.
The winner was required to grant to the Detroit Orchestra Inc. all
synchronization rights for motion pictures and mechanical rights for
phonographic recordings, electrical transcriptions and music rolls.
Robertson submitted a composition and was awarded $25,000.
Tips, bonuses, pensions, radio and newspaper contest prizes have
always been considered as taxable income. " Even though characterized
11. INT. REV. CODE § 51 (b).
12. Id. § 117 (e) (1).
13. Id. § 44.
14. Ibid.
15. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-4 (1943).
16. 343 U.S. 711, 72 Sup. Ct. 994 (1952).
17. Cesanelli v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 776 (1947); cf. McDermott v. Comm'r, 150
F.2d 585 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
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as gifts they are given in recognition of services rendered and so are
taxable. On the other hand the pure gift is exempt. Nobel prize win-
ners, Rhodes Scholars and recipients of college scholarships have in
the past enjoyed tax exemption.'" In McDermott v. Commissioner,"
the Ross prize, a $3,000 award by the American Bar Association, was
given in 1939 to a Duke law professor in recognition of an outstanding
paper on Administrative Law which he had submitted to the com-
mittee. The Court of Appeals held the award exempt as a gift. On
the taxable side of the line was a payment of $25,000 by the Pabst
Brewing Company for the best essay on Post War Employment. "° The
Supreme Court could have decided the Robertson case on the theory
that the donor was buying something, Robertson was selling some-
thing. This was the recognized distinction between the Ross prize and
the Pabst Brewing award. McDermott did not sell anything to the
Bar Association. The Bar Association did not buy anything from Mc-
Dermott. Pure scholarship was being fostered. The Pabst payment,
on the other hand, was tainted with commercialism. The tax bar
had generally understood the distinction to be whether the award
resulted from a philanthropic or commercial transaction. But the Su-
preme Court in a very unsatisfactory opinion taxed Robertson on the
ground that a binding contract resulted from an offer and acceptance.
Therefore, argued the Court, the payment could not have been a gift.
To what extent this will affect scholarships to students and stipends
to scholars and scientists, where the recipients are selected on a com-
petitive basis, must await further clarification by the Court. It seems
clear, however, that the rationale of this opinion has materially cur-
tailed the area of tax exempt awards.
Deductions
Income tax deductions fall into three classifications - business, non-
business and personal. Reasonable and necessary business expenses
as contrasted with capital expenditures are deductible." So are non-
business expenses if incurred in the production of income or in the
management, conservation or maintenance of income producing prop-
erty." In addition a few arbitrary expenses and losses are allowed even
though unrelated to business or to the production of taxable income
such as interest payments, taxes, charitable gifts, extraordinary medi-
cal expenses, alimony and losses through theft, storm, fire or casualty."2
All other personal, living and family expenses are specifically ex-
cluded."'
18. Cf. GCM 5881, VIII-I Cum. BULL. 68 (1929).
19. 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
20. Herbert Stein v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 494 (1950).
21. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (1).
22. Id. § 23 (a) (2).
23. Id. § 23.
24. Id. § 24(a).
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Certain illegal expenses have long been disallowed by regulations
and court decisions. Bribes to Congressmen," payments to stay the
hand of law enforcement officers
2" and payments to labor racketeers
-2 7
are disallowed in computing net income on the theory that such ex-
penses are contrary to public policy. Where to draw the line had long
troubled the -courts. It is clear that income from illegal operations is
taxable. Bootleggers, gamblers and others operating outside the law
have been careful not to run afoul of the Treasury. A gambler may
gross $100,000 but only net $50,000. He will have rent, office and travel
expense as well as "protection" costs. To disallow all his expenses
would frequently, at our present high rates, impose a tax considerably
in excess of his net. To avoid this dilemma a practical line has been
drawn which is best expressed by saying that the legitimate expenses
of an illegitimate business are deductible."
Opticians' Kickbacks
In Lilly v. Comm'r,- the Court held that payments by an optician
to doctors of one-third of the retail sales price received by the optician
from patients sent by doctors were properly deductible. This result
seems sound, even though from time immemorial such practices have
been regarded as against public policy and therefore illegal. The Court
frowned upon the Commissioner's setting himself up as a guardian of
the public morals. In view of recent developments within the Treasury
Department, the Court would appear to have exhibited rare and un-
usual foresight.
Legal Fees not Always Deductible
On the same day the Court rendered the Lilly decision, it decided
a case involving the deductibility of legal fees adversely to the tax-
payer." One Lykes had reported taxable gifts of stock at what the
Commissioner determined to be a substantial under-valuation. Lykes
employed counsel to contest the Commissioner's action in increasing
the amount of the gifts and consequently the amount of the tax. The
issue was compromised at a very material saving to the taxpayer. He
then claimed the right under section 23 (a) (2) to deduct the attorneys
fees incurred in settling this dispute. This provision permits the de-
duction of nonbusiness expenses incurred in the production of income
or in the management, conservation or maintenance of income produc-
ing property. It is clear that legal fees in the defense of a personal
injury suit are not deductible. They are personal expenses, disallowed
25. Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938).
26. Maddas v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 572 (1939).
27. Excelsior Baking Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 1949).
28. SURREY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 173 (1950).
29. 343 U.S. 90, 72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).
30. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 72 Sup. Ct. 585 (1952).
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under section 24 (a). On the other hand legal fees paid for income tax
advice or for advice concerning mortgage investments are deductible."
These fees are incurred in relation to the management of income pro-
ducing property. Lykes' difficulty was that he no longer owned the
property over which the dispute arose and the argument that any re-
duction in tax would result in the conservation of his property seems
untenable. The defense against liability for gift tax no more relates
to the conservation of income producing property than does the de-
fense of any personal tort action.
Conclusion
In the last two years we have had only five opinions in income tax
cases - none of them touching on basic issues of national importance.
The extortion and excessive compensation opinions followed well-
settled principles. While the prize case dealt with a small area of the
law in which there was considerable uncertainty it unsettled much
more than it settled. Again the deduction cases followed expected
lines. The selection of cases leaves much to be desired. But the fault
may be with our system and not with the Court. We expect it to have
expertness in too many complex and unrelated fields of law - Ad-
miralty, Patents, Bankruptcy, Labor, Anti-trusts and Corporate Re-
organization, to mention but a few. The members of the Court cannot
conceivably keep abreast with the developments in all these fields.
They cannot hope to have an awareness of the policy considerations
that should enter into the granting or denying of certiorari. What we
need, at least in some of these highly technical areas of the law, is a
series of appellate courts, each of which could develop expertness in a
particular field. The only refreshing aspect of this problem is that,
as always, the ingenuity of lawyers has found at least a temporary
solution. Major interpretative problems and the clarification of exist-
ing law, a function traditionally performed by courts of last resort,
is, in tax law, fast becoming a legislative function. More and more
tax lawyers are seeking to persuade Congress to clarify the law, to
finally determine the rule where the circuit courts are in conflict or
to overrule unrealistic Supreme Court decisions.
When the Supreme Court startled the business world with its de-
cision in Commissioner v. Smith,2 holding that the entire profit on
the exercise of a stock option by a corporate executive was taxable
as ordinary income in the year the option was exercised rather than
as a capital gain when and if the stock were sold, hundreds of execu-
tives holding options rushed to their Congressmen. Rather than argue
in the courts for a narrow intepretation of the Smith doctrine, their
31. T.D. 5513, 1946-1 Cumv. BuLL. 61.
32. 324 U.S. 177, 65 Sup. Ct. 591, 89 L. Ed. 830 (1945).
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lawyers drafted a workable rule and persuaded the Congress to make
it law." After the Supreme Court, first in the Tower case" and then
in the Culbertson case," unsettled the family partnership tax status
to the bewilderment of Tax Court, Treasury lawyers and the tax bar,
alike, it was Congress which gave us a workable rule fashioned after
the principles applicable to the family corporation." For years lawyers
were afraid of partial stock redemptions to pay death taxes. The
lower court cases gave no comfort. Rather than assume the delays
and risks involved in appealing to the Supreme Court, tax lawyers
sought and obtained adequate relief from Congress.' One of the vexing
problems over the years has been the distinction between ordinary
income and capital gain, the most recent version of this long dispute
being the sale of land with growing crops. Here again the taxpayers'
lawyers found it easier and more advantageous to seek Congressional
rather than judicial relief." The tax on a gain from involuntary
conversion - destruction, theft or condemnation - has long been post-
poned if the taxpayer invested the funds received on the conversion in
other property related in service or use." Court decisions held that the
taxpayer in order to get the benefit of this provision of the Code had
to use the very money received on account of the involuntary conver-
sion. For example, in the case of a fire, he had to use the very proceeds
received from his insurer. If he borrowed money in advance of set-
tling with his insurer and used these funds for the replacement the
section was held not to apply.' This was a literal but absurd interpre-
tation. Again, instead of going to the Supreme Court for a sensible
interpretation, Congress was persuaded to amend the Code to remove
these absurd judicial and administrative restrictions. "' These are but
a few illustrations of the fact that more cases are being won by tax-
payers in the Congress than in the Court.
33. INT. REV. CODE § 130 (a).
34. Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 289, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed. 670 (1946).
35. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 Sup. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949).
36. INT. REV. CODE § 191.
37. Id. § 115 (g).
38. Id. § 117(j).
39. Id. § 112(f).
40. Kennebec Box and Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 68 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1948).
41. INT. Rsv. CODE § 112 (4).
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